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Introduction  
In no other time has it been important to re-examine the lessons from the 1914 British and Indian 
campaigns in Mesopotamia. In Ottoman, Arabic and British sources there are important lessons 
to be shared with coalition military planners as they work towards stabilizing Iraq despite an 
increase in insurgency activity. This essay will explore various sources to highlight what can be 
learned from a campaign in Iraq that was conducted eighty years ago. Much like studying Viet-
cong, North Korean and Soviet tactics in the cold war, today’s staff colleges must look at obscure 
campaigns in the Middle East, and Africa as we face the problems of religious radicalism, tribal 
and clan warfare as well as rising nationalism in places like Afghanistan, Somalia and Basilan 
Island in the Philippines.  
Iraqi General Nadeem Writes the Best Arabic Version of the 1914 Iraq War 
The late Iraqi General Shukry Mahmood Nadeem wrote the most comprehensive study of the 
1914-1918 Mesopotamian campaigns in the Arabic language. It is considered an important 
modern military analytical work in Arabic. Originally published in 1954, Harb Al-Iraq 1914-1918 
Dirasa Ilmiyah underwent printings in 1956, 1962 and 1963.[1] What distinguishes the work from 
other Arabic military works is the detailed focus on tactics. Nadeem’s book forms an important 
part of Iraq’s military academy studies during the monarchy of King Faisal II, and then General 
Abdel-Karim Kassem and finally strongman Colonel Abdel-Rahman Arif. The quality of such 
rational military studies saw a steep decline under the Baathist regime from 1968 to 2003. So 
much so, that for an Arab to learn about the Iran-Iraq War in Arabic one has consult Egyptian 
books, chiefly the study done by former Egyptian Defense Minister Field Marshal Abdel-Halim 
Abu Gazallah. The rediscovery of this book and highlighting it today is vital in rediscovering a 
thoughtful military tradition lost to decades of Iraqi officers not being empowered to think rationally 
and freely about the defense of Iraq and instead focus on the appeasement of Saddam Hussein 
and his inner-circle. 
Reconstructing the New Iraqi Military   
Coalition forces are contending with the daunting task of reconstructing Iraq’s security forces, this 
includes a rediscovery of lost Iraqi military books that are positive and offer true historical and 
tactical analysis of military campaigns. Not conspiratorial and military articles that postulate 
absurd and bigoted notions about an adversary that was found in Iraqi military publications of the 
Saddam period. Nadeem’s book is a hidden military treasure that demonstrates to both Iraqi and 
American leaders the quality of Arab military thought in the pre-Baath period. 
Nadeem brings together Arabic, British and Ottoman sources. The book immediately 
demonstrates the use of tribal alliances by both Ottoman and British forces to gain a military 
advantage. Another lesson learned is the use of river gunboats and small watercraft not only for 
the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers but numerous tributaries and estuaries to conduct assaults from 
these rivers and for logistical re-supply of ground forces. Nadeem also discusses the British use 
of air reconnaissance one of the earliest examples of the application of airpower in an 
information-gathering role. 
Nadeem’s preface mentions how honored he is to have a fourth edition published and how this 
work forms an important part of examining Iraqi officers who apply to the higher staff college in 
Baghdad.[2] The work is also worthy of analysis as former Saddam loyalists no doubt have come 
across Nadeem’s book as a means of studying how to frustrate British and coalition forces in 
varied regions of Iraq. One must assume, that since it underwent its fourth printing in nine years 
(1956 to 1963), this is a widely distributed book among Iraqi officers. The copy obtained for this 
review was through Georgetown University and is the fourth edition. 
Strategic Assessment 
In 1914, the Ottoman Empire existed only in name and a group of army officers created the 
Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), which was the real power behind Sultan Mohammed V. 
Military leaders like Enver Pasha, and Talat Pasha were all products of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II 
(1876 to 1909) pro-German policies. This culminated in a secret pact signed between the 
Germans and Ottomans in August 1914. Iraq, at the time was divided into three sanjaks (Ottoman 
governing regions) of Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad. Nadeem opens with a strategic assessment 
and highlights the reorganization of British Indian auxiliary forces in 1904, which left only one 
Indian Expeditionary Division, dedicated to the protection of Persian Gulf interests. The Sixth 
“Indian” Expeditionary Division was composed of the 16th, 17th and 18th Infantry Regiments. A 
decade later this force would be called upon to defend several key strategic interests:[3] 
· The 140-mile Anglo-Persian oil pipeline.  
· The oil refineries at Abadan.  
The central debate of the Mesopotamian campaigns was whether to secure Arabstan and the 
British oil interests only or press forward and drive out Ottoman forces from Mesopotamia 
(modern Iraq) in a bold strategy called forward defense. 
Landings in Basra 
British and Indian Expeditionary Force left Bombay (7,000 troops) in mid-October and has been 
positioned in anticipation of the formal Ottoman declaration of war to secure Abadan. Between 
mid-October and the landing of 600 British/Indian troops on Fao Peninsula on November 7th, the 
Commanding General Sir Arthur Bennett used the time to practice to exercise his force in 
amphibious landings and combined operations with the Royal Navy.  
The Ottomans sent two regiments to intercept the British landing force, but it was too little too late. 
One of the little known secrets of the success of the British landings is the alliance they had 
bought of the Sheikh of Muhamara who provided valuable intelligence on Ottoman movements. 
Both Shiekh of Muhamara and the Emir of Kuwait both received protection and funds from the 
British, and their territory bordered one another. This cultivation of tribal fiefdoms enabled British 
units to be sent prior to the landing to cut the Fao to Basra telegraph wire. The constant 
information from these tribes is highlighted in General Nadeem’s book and allowed the British 
16th and 18th divisions supported by a flotilla of gunboats to envelope four Turkish regiments of 
1,500 troops and 2,000 volunteers.[4] 
In March 2003, the attack on Basra and the Shatt Al-Arab waterway was a combined Anglo-
American operation. It consisted of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit assigned to the British 3rd 
Commando Brigade. The MEU combined infantry strike capability from the air and sea, secured 
the Fao Peninsula and seized oil facilities offshore. The focus was securing oil installations to 
prevent the Baathists from destroying them. Royal Navy frigates HMS Marlborough and Chatham 
as well as a Royal Australian Navy frigate that laid down suppressive gunfire on Iraqi defenses 
supported the operation. After securing wellheads, the 3rd Commando Brigade and 15th MEU 
advanced toward Umm Qasr (Iraq’s only port) and Zubayr (a naval base) within 96 hours.[5] As in 
1914 advanced securing of Fao was necessary to begin an assault on Iraq from the Shat-Al-Arab 
waterway northward. 
Occupation of Basra (November 27, 1914): A Lesson in Civil Affairs   
Ottomans unused to combined naval and infantry tactics panicked and ordered the evacuation of 
the city. Marsh Arabs from the southern estuaries arrived before the British and began to loot the 
city. Finally, as the Ottoman forces withdrew, the Turkish commanders scuttled four ships vessels 
tied together to form a barrier against approaching British gunboats, this action along with mining 
should’ve been done as the English Expeditionary Force amassed in Bahrain. The current swung 
one vessel aside and allowed the British flotilla to enter the Shat Al-Arab one at a time.[6] 
What is extraordinary is the way in which British commanders brought in members of the revenue 
service to sort through documents in Basra. The occupying force made distinctions between 
Turkish combatants, Ottoman administrators and Arab peoples of Iraq. The Turkish subjects were 
treated as combatants and the Arabs cultivated as allies if possible. This led to discussions 
among British officers as how to provide Arabs who were technically “enemy aliens,” benefits. 
Mesopotamian Arabs were issued papers describing the bearer as subjects of the Occupied 
Ottoman Territory of Mesopotamia. This achieved two things a semblance of order and 
administration for the Shiite Arab majority and identification of the population.[7] 
The British complained of too few British and Indian military police units and they could not 
prevent piracy and banditry from the Fao to Basra and along the Shat Al-Arab estuary. Sir Percy 
Cox identified a Mr. Gregson, a retired Colonial Indian Police expert who had a propensity for 
languages and did his duty patrolling what is today’s Pakistani Northwestern Frontier. Gregson 
and his staff arrived a week into the occupation of Basra. Here is what is known about what he 
did, Gregson[ 8]: 
· Established police posts wherever the Turkish had them;  
· Brought in Indian Muslims from the Punjab, Somalia and Aden to police Basra;  
· Declared martial-law and sent notice to the population that trial by courts-martial would 
be undertaken in particular for murderers.  
The British police force noted the initial caution of the Arab inhabitants of Basra unsure if the 
Ottomans would return and exact vengeance. They had been subject to the oppressive rule of 
Fakhri Pasha who hanged Arabs for the slightest offense, and had prisoners sewn into sacks and 
dropped into the Shat Al-Arab estuary. 
Another aspect that was brought to the attention of British military planners in Basra was dealing 
with the economy. Indian silver rupees and banknotes were brought in and an exchange rate 
established. Other highlights included cultivating relations and co-opting Shia and Sunni tribes, 
visits from British officials to tribal leaders that bolstered the Sheikh’s standing among his people. 
The cultivation of tribes were a risk and gamble with examples such as Sayyid Talib Pasha, an 
influential Sunni who controlled the Muntafiq Shiite Tribal Confederation who coveted 
autonomous rule over Basra to the exclusion of other tribal unions. This was unacceptable and 
Sayyid Talib was marginalized and switched over to the Ottomans and Germans.[9] 
However with enough money and a demonstration of military might, Sheikh Ibrahim of Zubair and 
the Sheikh of Hartha cooperated with the British. To the uninitiated these tribal unions could be 
dismissed but the British having experienced the Indian Sepoy Rebellion and using their long 
experience in co-opting the Sheikhs along the Persian Gulf coast understood these alliances 
meant access to land between Basra and Qurna on the way to Baghdad unmolested, and 
conserving British firepower for the Ottomans. April 13, 1915 is an example of neglecting tribal 
co-optation a Turkish force augmented with tribes was near Al-Shuayba, and entered into battle 
with the British who had secured Basra. After the Ottomans were beaten, they retreated through 
Lake Hammar (Muntafiq territory) where the Muntafiq tribe fell on them, massacring the Turks.[10] 
In 2002, General Tommy Franks rightly assessed that British forces had the experience operating 
in Southern Iraq and could secure the Shat Al-Arab and Basra while attempting to pacify the 
populace.[11] 
Ottoman Errors 
Nadeem analyzes each battle in terms of lessons learned and what in hindsight the Ottomans 
should’ve done. In the capture of Basra, Umm Qasr and Fao in Southern Iraq, he says the 
Ottoman did not:[12] 
· Reinforce Fao, equipping it with shore batteries to deny a British amphibious landing;  
· Develop secondary defensive lines to contain British forces in Fao;  
· Deny the Shat-Al-Arab waterway to British gunboats by mining and scuttling ships;  
· Harass of Abadan should’ve occurred once British Task Force D entered the Persian Gulf 
and marshaled in Bahrain.  
The Impact of Declaration of Jihad by Sultan Mohammed V  
Jihad declarations in World War I, differ from today’s daily declarations of Jihad from those 
untrained in Islamic law, thought and precedent. Al-Qaeda’s Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri lack the 
religious authority to declare a jihad and many clerics today issue fatwas that contradict and 
astound Muslims. Today there is no central authority to rule between the competing fatwas. In 
World War I, Ottoman ruler Sultan Mohammed V, used his title Caliph (Khalifa) as the singular 
authority to rule on religious issues. He wasted no time in declaring a Jihad against Britain, 
France and Russia. It was hoped a Muslim mass uprising would ensue among the subjects of the 
Russian caucuses, French North Africa and British India. This did not materialize, but the Jihad 
declaration had an impact in tribal cooptation in Iraq.  
The Iraqi tribes who responded to the Ottoman fatwa of jihad included the Bani Turuf, the Bani 
Saaleh, the Bani Tameem, the Bani Skain, the Fallahiyah Ch’aab (Nation), the Mirs of Hindayan 
and the Ghabdan of the Bani Lam. The Ghabdan of the Bani Lam offered several gold guineas 
for every British or Indian head brought to the chieftain.[13]  
Debate onto Baghdad or Secure Arabstan?  
The ease in which the initial attack of Southern Iraq and securing Abadan occurred led to a 
debate between London and Delhi (the British Indian Administration) over whether to seize the 
initiative and march on Baghdad. Sir Percy Cox argued for pressing onward to Baghdad and the 
field commander in Mesopotamia, General Arthur Barrett argued that it was 400 miles to 
Baghdad and even if he had defeated the Ottomans, he had too few troops to secure the city. 
Securing Arabstan and creating defense in depth of British oil interests in Persia would be the 
initial focus. Al-Qurna was to be the next objective to add the rich agricultural region to sustain 
refineries and industry in Abadan. Taking Qurna made tactical sense, it was where the 38th 
Ottoman Division retreated, and it was an ideal logistical base since it lay at the intersection of the 
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.[14] Qurna also added a rich agricultural region to sustain the 
refineries in Abadan, Persia. What is militarily significant about Qurna, is the Ottomans when they 
chose to defend an area were stubborn and tenacious, but when something was tactically 
unexpected during this defense, the Ottoman forces in Iraq surrendered or fled. Initially Barrett’s 
two infantry battalions were inadequate to take the village but reinforcements were needed from 
Basra. The British succeeded in taking the village with 2,100 troops coming from the rear, while 
British gunboats diverted and kept the Ottomans occupied to the North at the Tigris-Euphrates 
river confluences, which Subhi Bey, the Ottoman commander, had expected a direct assault. The 
Turks seeing they had been outflanked and surrendered without a fight in December 1914. 
The Ignored Tactical Mind of Colonel Suleiman Al-Askary  
The Ottoman General Staff frustrated by the abysmal performance of the Ottoman 38th Division 
in Southern Iraq assigned an Arab Colonel Suleiman Al-Askary to take charge. The Ottomans 
however could never fully allow him free control so his impact was not felt. Nadeem discusses 
some of his initial ideas before Ottoman General in Mesopotamia Bakr Bey, overruled him. 
Colonel Al-Askary had little combat experience, but was aggressive and popular with irregular 
tribal warriors. Askary proposed organizing the 35th (arriving from the Levant) and 38th Divisions, 
volunteers and irregulars into two diversionary forces and one main attack force to capture Basra. 
The Karun River Attack Force would advance along the Karun River south to threaten Al-
Muhammara forcing the British to divert forces to defend the tribe they found to be so cooperative. 
The Dajlah River Attack Force would travel southward along the Dajlah River to attack Al-Qurna. 
These were diversions that masked the 35th Division plus assault traveling south along the 
Euphrates to attack Basra from Al-Zubair. General Bakr wanted to harass Arabstan and threaten 
Ahvaz until the arrival of the 35th Ottoman Division and then wanted to concentrate his effort on 
creating chaos on British oil installations. 
Nadeem spends several pages discussing the military tactical innovations and what might have 
been had Askari been given full command.[15] Askary understood the Euphrates and wanted to 
engage British forces in areas where the gunboats would have less maneuverability. He 
immediately understood the need to negate the British advantage of joint river and ground 
operations. Askary assessed that the Euphrates between Nasiriya and Shuayba represented a 
chance to contain British gunboats due to the shallowness of the part of the river.  
1915: Ottomans Mount an Assault on Arabstan (Persia) 
Ottomans, on the January 26, 1915, used a cavalry regiment, an infantry battalion and tribal 
irregulars of the Bani Lam and Bani Tarf to harass the Persian town of Ahvaz from the Iraqi town 
of Amara. The British sent the 12th regiment to quell this harassment and understood the need to 
secure Ahvaz, which offered a direct overland route to Abadan. Barrett pursued this Ottoman 
harassment force and engaged them unconventionally, which was the Ottoman/Arab strength. In 
the marshes and banks of the River Karkha, Barrett’s force took a beating and suffered its first 
serious loss. 
After their successes in Basra and Qurna, the British drove the Ottoman force 13 kilometers north 
of the Tigris to Ruta, a failed Anglo-Indian raid on Ruta of 3,000 troops failed to dislodge the 
Ottomans.[16] The British then focused on pouring more troops into Ahvaz, which included the 
7th Rajputs and 1,000 tribesmen from the Sheikh of Muhamara who had old scores to settle with 
the tribes attached to the Ottoman harassing force.[17] Persian Bakhtairi tribes were disunited 
and a significant number had investments in Anglo-Persian and were not inclined to see the 
British fail. The British created an 11,000-man force the South Persian Rifles to keep order along 
the Iraqi-Persian border in 1916. 
The Battle of Al-Shuaybah  
Although the Ottomans were unsuccessful, this particular battle saw the Turks going on the 
offensive in a conventional manner. Till this point the Ottomans in Iraq were fighting defensively 
and only offensively in guerilla style tactics along the Iraqi-Iranian border. Drawing under two 
dozen regiments from Nasiriyah, Rutah and Huwayzah supported by 30,000 tribal irregulars and 
forty cannon, the Ottomans engaged in stunted attacks on the British garrison at Al-Shuaybah on 
the night of April 11, 1915. They combined artillery and infantry and were able to get within 1,000 
yards of the garrison. Seeing the size of the Ottoman force, the British sent two battalions from 
the 30th Division to reinforce Shuaybah. This force arrived on April 13th, and began securing the 
elevations occupied by the Ottomans and used to pour artillery fire on Shuaybah. Suleiman Al-
Askary ordered a withdrawal that day, but paused one day to bury the dead. The British mounted 
an overland cavalry assault supported by a regiment of infantry, but when the orderly withdrawal 
Askary had planned turned into a rout that cost 6,000 Ottoman dead and 1,200 British dead, 
Askary committed suicide over his military debacle.[18] 
A second Ottoman harassment force crossed the Tigris and was sent in early April 1915 to 
threaten pro-British Persia and particularly the refinery at Ahvaz. A third force of 24,000 irregulars 
left Nasiriyah south to harass British forces in Basra. These were all diversionary attacks for the 
Ottoman main effort to recapture Shuaybah. The British had been reinforced in Basra with 30,000 
men but were short of supplies and in particular fresh water. The Ottomans also coordinated 
simultaneous artillery attacks on Shuaybah and Qurna.[19] What saved Shuaybah was the 
inability of the Ottomans to coordinate artillery and infantry assaults along with the British sending 
two brigades at the right time to reinforce Al-Shuaybah. 
Lessons from Shuaybah 
Ottomans could have learned much from this battle, they had a problem of concentrating their 
forces, cooperation among units, and conducting advanced reconnaissance. Other problems 
included controlling forces with a mix of irregular volunteers and regular Ottoman troops and 
finally finding counter-measures to superior British firepower. The British although the victors 
never understood they could not sustain the same casualties as the Ottomans and needed to 
appreciate that the assault did require reinforcements from other units policing southern Iraq. 
Instead of taking stock of the casualties, the British declared victory and decided to press onward 
to Nasiriyah. 
Riverine Warfare 
General Barrett would be replaced by General (Sir) John Nixon. Realizing the importance of the 
network of waterways in Iraq, he ordered every regiment to have personnel trained in using local 
river boats known as Al-Bilaam (plural). These indigenous craft resemble large canoes that carry 
half a ton. His efforts led to each regiment possessing or contracting seventy local Arab river 
boats. The combination of watercraft and engineers would be vital in the battles to come, 
beginning with the battle of Nasiriyah. Iraq prior to building of a network of dams in the twentieth 
century had annual floods that left horse and vehicular traffic useless as it waded through knee-
deep mud. In addition, floods would break up units as they sought high ground. As the Ottomans 
struggled with repositioning forces due to floods, Nixon had organized 372 Bahl-maan (singular) 
Boats for his 17th Division under General Townsend. The first test came on June 3, 1915, when 
the 17th Division assaulted from the river supported by aerial reconnaissance and gunboats. The 
1,000-man Ottoman force in Amara surrendered with no resistance and Ottomans sent a 
battalion to reinforce Amara but was broken up by British river gunboats. 
Nixon now set his sights on Nasiriyah which would deny Ottoman forces a vital road and river link 
to Kut and would allow for the subjugation of a troublesome tribe led by Ajami (Pasha) Saadoun. 
On June 16th, Nixon gave orders to Gen Gorringe’s 12th Division who dispatched the 30th 
Regiment, two companies of artillery and a riverine fleet to pave the way for the assault on 
Nassiriyah. This involved spending June clearing the Euphrates River access between Hamar, 
Kabaish and Souq Al-Sheyeakh, some of which had solid earthworks constructed by the 
Ottomans. Gorringe’s force began the battle for Nasiriyah on night of July 7-8. 
Gorringe’s force found the initial going difficult not just because the 35th Ottoman Division had set 
up two defensive rings using an infantry regiment, Cavalry Company, and eight cannon around 
the city. The Ottomans had scuttled ships to bar British craft from approaching Nasiriyah, but also 
the heat (115 degrees Fahrenheit) and disease sapped the strength of the British attackers.[20] 
Another nuisance was the Bidoos Tribe that owed allegiance to neither the Ottomans nor British 
and ambushed both for plunder. Both sides began with inadequate forces, as Gorringe brought 
the bulk of the 12th Infantry Division and the Ottomans sent a regiment based in Kut. Gorringe 
attacked again in the darkness of July 13-14, but was again unsuccessful. It was not until the 18th 
Division was sent and an assault on both banks of the Euphrates commenced that the first and 
second lines of defense fell on July 25th. Gorringe was able to capture Nasiriyah using the tactic 
of waterborne river infantry assaults that completely surprised the Ottomans. The butcher’s bill 
was 2,000 Ottoman and 400 British/Indian troops. The British occupying Nasiriyah left only Kut as 
the only remaining Ottoman-held urban center that could threaten Ahvaz, Amara and Nasiriyah. 
Once Kut was taken the British oil interests along the Persian and Iraqi border would be secure. 
Commander-in-Chief General Nixon tasted victory now in Amara and Nasiriyah, ignoring the high 
casualties and more importantly not allowing the tenuous state of his logistical trail dissuade him 
for pressing onward to Baghdad. This high rate of success of British forces followed by high 
casualties and overstretched logistical line would continue as they captured Kut Al Amara in 
September 1915, British Gods of War would not be so favorable at the Battle of Ctesiphon. 
Battle of Ctesiphon 
General Townsend, commanding the 6th Poona Division, drew up a force of 11,000 troops of the 
16th, 17th, and 18th Divisions and a portion of the 30th Division reinforced by a cavalry regiment 
and gunboat fleet. Kut was defended by 7,000 Ottomans and thirty-one artillery pieces. The Battle 
of Kut was doomed from the start, as the British planned the attack with hardly adequate logistical 
transport. Heat degraded British units by fifty percent in some units. The British should’ve known 
heat was a factor in the Battles of Nasiriya and Amara. Floods impacted Turkish defenses of Kut 
causing Turkish units to be separated as they concentrated around islands. The mud around 
Atabah and Sawabah Marshes around Kut made maneuver difficult. A deceiving factor was the 
British success at Qurna which the British thought was due to Ottomans cowardice but was also 
due to the Shat-Al-Arab waterway beginning to rise and drive Ottoman forces out. The Turks 
understood that the floods reached a height of three feet and made carting artillery and supplies 
difficult if they remained at Qurna. 
General Townsend argued with his Commander in Chief General Nixon against further extending 
his supply line. Townsend wanted the lifeline to his division at Basra consolidated and secured, 
extra transport and trench warfare equipment before proceeding. Nixon overruled his field 
commander and ordered him to press forward based on the eagerness of the British Indian Home 
Government.[21] At Ctesiphon, Ottoman Commander in Chief Noureddine constructed two lines 
of deep earthen works that straddled the Tigris River and placed 18,000 Ottoman regulars. 
Townsend with 11,000 troops attacked using his tested method of a river assault, beginning on 
November 22, 1915 with a gunboat bombardment along with nigh time infantry assault. British 
infantry got lost in the night march and the Ottomans learning from previous battles had mined 
the Tigris and placed artillery to keep the British monitors and gunboats at bay. By the next day 
Townsend had suffered a casualty rate of forty percent (4,500) and the Ottomans (9,600). The 
advantage the Ottomans had was their logistical base was shorter only twenty-five kilometers to 
Baghdad where reserves could be called to the defense of Ctesiphon.[22] Noureddine unsure of 
British infantry numbers and thinking that reserves were on the way as well as suffering over fifty 
percent casualties ordered a retreat. The Ottoman Commander reversed his order when 
intelligence showed that Townsend and his 6th Poona Division were in dire straits and elements 
of the 30,000 Ottoman troop reinforcement from the Levant began to arrive. Townsend after 
conducting aerial reconnaissance, ordered the first British retreat of the Iraqi campaign falling 
back to Kut. The combined British and Indian forces fought a rear guard action the entire way 
back to Kut, where Townsend reinforced the city and awaited a Turkish onslaught. The British 
had lost 5,000 troops, the gunboats and Townsend informed Nixon of his need for reinforcement 
from Basra.[23]  
World War I Style Psychological Operations  
In Ronald Millar’s 1970 book, The Death of an Army: The Siege of Kut 1915-1916, he discusses 
how the Ottomans and Germans mastered the art of agitation. Leaflets smuggled in identified 
Ctesiphon as a place of Muslim significance, being the burial sight of Prophet Muhammad’s best-
loved companion Salman Pak. The propaganda attempted to demoralize Muslim Indian troops 
who were part of the expedition and it indeed it was successful in causing a private in General 
Townsend’s 20th Punjabis to shoot a fellow sentry and an NCO.[24] This kind of agitation was 
also seen along the Iraqi-Persian border and was successful in turning the majority of Iraq’s tribes 
to serve alongside the Ottomans. Another successful effort of the Ottomans was the effective use 
of spreading rumors among the tribes that increased the fog of war. Such as a rumor that 4,000 
Ottomans and two guns arrived at the left bank of the Tigris River below Kut or that Ctesiphon 
had been retaken.  
The Siege at Kut  
Much like Gettysburg is the turning point of the Civil War, in the Mesopotamian Campaign, Kut 
represented a turning point in the virtual British combat successes and the Ottoman struggle for 
the defense of Iraq. British intelligence indicated that Iraq would be reinforced by two Ottoman 
divisions, the 51st and 52nd infantry, this information was not shared by Townsend. This Ottoman 
reinforcement was in response to Ottoman field commander Noureddine Bey’s cable to the 
Ottoman General Staff on July 25th. In it Noureddine argued that he could not contain rebellions 
in Karballah and Najaf, the two Shiite holy cities and defend Iraq against British assaults with one 
army corps. He proposed concentrating Ottoman offensive efforts along the Euphrates River 
valley using the 35th, and 38th divisions and use the 45th division to defend Baghdad. 
Noureddine intended to use irregulars to harass British forces Al-Samawa and conduct what they 
do best, guerrilla style tactics. The Ottoman General Staff would find forces in the Levant to send 
to Noureddine. These forces would be sent at a critical point leading to General Townsend’s 
withdrawal to Kut. 
In December 1915, General Noureddine and his German advisor General Baron Von Der Goltz 
undertook three failed attempts to penetrate British defenses at Kut. Noureddine then decided to 
seal off Kut from any re-supply, successfully parrying British relief efforts on January 6th, 13th, 
and 21st as well as March 8th and April 5th, 1916 to break the siege. Noureddine had 
concentrated over 22,500 troops and seventy-two guns to face any British reinforcement from the 
south. He could also rely on over 30,000 regular Ottoman troops in Baghdad to reinforce him. 
Townsend force having been ravaged by disease and basic starvation negotiated an 
unconditional surrender with General Khalil Pasha, the Ottoman Military Governor of Baghdad, 
surrendering 8,000 British and Indian troops, in addition 23,000 British and Indian lives were lost 
both in Kut and in attempting to break the siege. Who were treated with cruelty by the Ottomans 
and many dying during their captivity until the armistice of 1918. General Townsend spent the 
remainder of the war as an honored guest of the Ottomans. Gallipoli is often remembered as the 
most crushing defeat of British arms in World War I, the Siege of Kut is arguably the second most 
significant defeat of the British Army in this conflict in many ways the surrender echoed the defeat 
at Yorktown. 
1917: The Fall of Baghdad and British Tactical Recovery  
With the surrender of Kut in 1915, it was not until 1917 that the British resumed offensive 
operations. General (Sir) Frederick Maude replaced General Nixon. Where Nixon fought 
methodical campaigns using river and infantry forces, Maude’s tactics are more reflective of 
modern small operations warfare scene today. During the lull in fighting that lasted over a year 
the British concentrated on developing their base at Basra connecting it to Nasiriya by rail and 
constructing warehouses, port facilities, hospitals and camps. The British also replaced and 
expanded their fleet of river steamers. Maude organized his 48,000 troops into I Indian Corps 
under Lt. Gen. Cobbe and the III Indian Corps under Lt Gen Marshall.[25] 
In March 1917, reinforced and learning the lessons of re-supply the British retook Kut and 
beginning in October 1917, Maude concentrated on mop up operations isolating garrisons and 
irregular units that fed that drained the British main efforts to capture Kut and Baghdad. He 
secured Daur with 4,200 Ottoman troops and loyalists, Tikrit with 1,360 (Saddam’s Provincial 
Hometown Capital), Al-Auja with 1,100 (Saddam’s birthplace) and Fathah with 5,100. Leaving 
one of those villages or hamlets meant harassment and a base for Ottomans and anti-British 
tribes to regroup.[26] Maude’s attack in Kut saw Marshall’s III Indian Corps west of Kut, 
eliminating Turkish bridgeheads through intense hand-to-hand fighting, Cobbe’s I Indian Corps 
attacked from the east cutting through six lines of trenches. Outflanked Ottoman General 
Noureddine retreated to Baghdad. 
At Baghdad, Khalil Pasha was in command and was not a field commander like Noureddine. His 
focus was internal repression and after numerous attempts British forces crossed the Diyala River 
and caught Khalil unprepared for a defense of Baghdad. The Ottomans simply did not prepare for 
a British onslaught soon after the capture of Kut, they expected that a pause would ensue for 
General Maude to reinforce Kut and then push onward. The interesting part is the citizens of 
Baghdad generally welcomed British administration, financial liberalism and had heard from 
relations in Nasiriya and Amara of civil order and leniency the British had brought to these towns. 
However, fighting did break out between Shiite and Sunni factions in the city.[27] 
Maude noted that the 2,000 demobilized Persians who retreated as part of the Ottoman 13th 
Army that was defeated at Hamdan in Iraq would go back to Persia to foment anti-British 
incitement and organize an underground anti-British resistance. Although on a small scale, this 
tactic of demobilized elements regrouping in an underground adversarial organization would be 
replayed in 2003-2004 with the former Republican Guard and Fedayeen Saddam that melted in 
the face of coalition forces and regrouped within the Iraqi insurgency. The November 1917 attack 
on Tikrit was the most interesting of the half dozen British mop up operations, the Ottomans had 
dug eight miles of trenches and selected the walled town of Tikrit to make a stand against the 
British. The Ottomans did not select Tikrit by accident the town rose eighty feet in a sheer cliff 
from the Tigris River and was 150 feet above river level.[28] The only approach was through open 
plains to the South. General Cobbe provided a feint direct assault using infantry and artillery 
supporting in a nighttime attack, while using the bulk of his 7th Division to create right and left 
pincers around Tikrit and the Tigris. Commander-in-Chief Maude died on November 18, 1917, not 
of combat but of cholera. General Marshall who assumed command continued the policy of 
dealing with pockets of villages that drained the British main objective of taking Baghdad by 
securing Qala, Shirwan and Diyala.[29] 
During the summer of 1917, the British Imperial Staff began a serious discussion of developing 
Iraqi’s railway and river system of transport. A study by Major General Freeland proposed a rail 
link from Basra up the Euphrates River via Nasiriyah to Baghdad. Senior British Commander 
General Marshall concurred with this assessment with the addition that the Tigris River had been 
difficult to navigate with co charts to reveal shallows, rapids and hidden shoals. Although a good 
idea, the British Imperial Staff did not want to commit an additional cavalry and eight infantry 
regiments required to secure a rail link. However by March 1918, the British had guarded what 
precious rail links remained and built two railway links from Basra that connected Nasiriyah and 
Amara as well as five links connecting Baghdad to Samara, Kut and Baquba. None connected 
the two major cities of Basra (site of the main British logistics base) and Baghdad (the capital).  
The Najaf Conspiracy 
The Najaf Conspiracy is perhaps a little known studied element of successful psychological and 
urban incitement carried out by the Germans and Ottomans combined. German gold was used to 
foment riots and insurgencies up and down the Euphrates from Najaf leading to the killing of a 
British Political Officer. The task was to embolden the population to make it as uncomfortable as 
possible for British forces on their way to Baghdad. Another strategic problem for the British was 
the rise of Russian Bolshevism in 1917 and collapse of the Tsarist Romanov Dynasty. This meant 
33,000 Russian troops, allied with the British, and keeping Ottoman forces occupied along the 
Persian frontier, Anatolia and the Crimean border would be diverted from Iraq to deal with the 
internal stability of Russia.[30] This use of internal Iraqi tribes and urban riots would be seen 
again in Operation Iraqi Freedom as U. S. Special Forces used money, weapons and expertise to 
encourage the Kurds to join in an assault on Saddam’s forces in the North and using Iraqi exiles 
formed into a cadre of Free Iraq Force would assist coalition forces as translators and join in the 
liberation of their country. The use of micro-loans and small self-improvement projects by U.S. 
forces at the company level were successful initially in gaining the support of tribes. 
Lessons from 1914 and 2004 and Conclusion 
There are concrete lessons to be drawn between the British Expeditionary Force that fought in 
World War I and coalition forces who liberated Iraq from Saddam Hussein in 2003 and whose 
work continues today. The similarities can be summarized as follows and both military planners 
had to contend with: 
Logistics: In 2003, U.S. forces advanced so rapidly that it challenged the logistical trail to catch up 
with fast moving armored formations. It was U.S. Army logistics trucks that were assaulted by 
Fedayeen Saddam in 2003 and led to the Jessica Lynch incident. U.S. Army and Marine 
commanders constantly worried about ensuring their forces were amply supplied. The British in 
1914 also contended with challenges to supplies as they advanced northward to Baghdad. It was 
the inability to secure the Basra to Baghdad river routes that led General Townsend’s disaster at 
Kut. Simply the Ottomans could divert more resources with their main logistics base in Baghdad 
than the British could from Basra. Today, Operation Iraqi Freedom would not have been possible 
were it not for Kuwaiti cooperation in staging massive amounts of military equipment.  
Tribal Incitement, Intelligence Gathering and Tactics: In 1914, gruesome tactics were employed 
by tribes incited by the Ottomans to include beheadings. The Ghabdan of the Bani Lam offered 
several gold guineas for every British or Indian head brought to the chief. In addition, Ottoman 
and German incitement in Persia was a concern of British military planners. Finally, in 1914, the 
tribal sheikh of Muhammara and Kuwait were pivotal to British forces landing in Iraq. 
Debate about Enough Troops: In 2004, there continues to be a heated debate about whether or 
not there were adequate U.S. forces on the ground. The British over ninety years ago grappled 
with the same question, initially there were enough forces to secure Southern Iraq but they found 
that keeping order in occupied cities was a challenge that required expertise and troops. The 
inadequate amount of forces was shown during the disaster in Kut in 1915. After Kut, the British 
sent further units into Iraq. 
Civil Affairs: The British of World War I, identified retired colonial police administrators who 
brought a semblance of order in Basra. They also had the foresight to include members of the 
revenue service and bureaucrats who could quickly organize documents scattered and left behind 
after a retreating army. One of the most memorable aspects of civil affairs was the introduction of 
the Indian Rupee and creation of market economies as a means of engaging the population in the 
pursuit of sustaining British forces in Iraq. 
Weather: In 2003, U.S. forces encountered the mother of all sandstorms that limited visibility for 
both the opposing Iraqis and Americans. Ninety years ago it was flooding and heat that wore 
down both sides. 
Waging Irregular War from Hamlets: This was a difficult lessons for the British to learn and it was 
not until General Marshall assumed command in 1917 (the British had been in Iraq fighting the 
Ottomans for three years) that a serious attempt at pacifying villages were made. With trial and 
error, it was finally realized that tribesmen loyal and bought by the Ottomans formed an irregular 
force that sapped British efforts towards Baghdad. With their initial tactic (1914-1915) of widening 
the security zone from the oil regions of Abadan, as British forces acquired more Iraqi territory (in 
particular major urban areas) they began to understand that leaving hostile tribes in villages only 
served to undermine British zones of security. At the time of writing this essay U.S. Marines are 
beginning a massive assault on Fallujah, it has always been understood that hamlets that allow 
insurgents to remain active only serve to undermine the Interim Iraqi Government and planned 
elections for January 2005. 
Conclusion 
A reexamination of the Mesopotamian campaigns of World War I is a must for up-and-coming 
U.S. officers who are about to take command at the company level. As U.S. forces become more 
involved in the region, an Iran developing nuclear weapons and Syria that is undermining Iraqi 
stability, studying these campaigns and understanding terrain and maneuver becomes that much 
more important today. Such books that highlight the tactics of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam’s war 
against the Kurdish separatist fighters or the Yemen War of 1962 to 1967 are the kinds of 
conflicts that need to be dusted off and discussed in U.S. military tactical discourse. 
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